-T7      '' 

itszo 


vaiuaoie  sugges 
Conf  Pam  12mo  #520 


VALUABLE  SUGGESTIONS 

ADDRESSEi)    TO 

THE  SOLDIERS  OF'THE  CONFEDERATE  STATES, 

BY  KEV.  A,  B.  LONQSTBEKT,  LK  D, 

Chapter  I. 

I  do  not  know  that  the  attempt  has  ever  been 
made  to  improve  soldiers  by  an  address  to  their 
reason  and  understanding,  I  propose  to  try 
the  experiment,  Ijeginning  with  the  neio  re- 
cruits. 

It  has  grown  into  a  proverb,  that  "  one  Imn- 
dred  regulars  zcill  uMj)  four  hundred  raw 
itrQops."  The  liistory  of  all  wars  proves  this 
to  be  substantially  true.  And  yet,  the  hun- 
dred, and  the  four  hundred,  are  made  up  of 
the  same  material.  How  happens  it  that  there 
is  such  a  disparity  between  them  ?  *  Can  mere 
drilling  make  one  man  bolder  than  another? 
Impossible,  as  is  proved  by  the  fact,  that  when 
brought  into  battle  lor  the  first  time,  they  are 
all  alike — all  equally  alarm.ed  and  all  equally 
apt  to  run.  But  the  regulars  soon  become  ac- 
customed to  battle,  and  nothing  gives  us  alarm 
to  which  we  are  accustomed.  They  soon  dis- 
cover, too,  that  the  roar  of  cannon  and  the 
buratiog  of- bombs,  which   terrified  them  so 


much  in  the  first  battle,  are  the  most  harmless 
of  all  the  implements  of  Wc^rfave  brought  into 
the  fields.  They  are  better  than  raw  troops, 
simply  because  the};,  have  got  over  the  fears  of 
raw  troops.  If,  therefore,  it  were  possible  for 
new  recruits  to  engage  in  their  first  battle  with 
the  calmness  and  self-possession  of  veterans, 
they  would  be  equal  to  veterans.  Is  this  im- 
possible r*  Certainly  not;  for  most  of  the  troops 
with  which  Bonaparte  fought  the  battle  at 
Waterloo  were  new  levies,  and  they  fought  as 
gallantly  as  the  best-^n  tlie  field.  This  they 
did  from  the  confidence  in  their  (Greneral.  They 
doubtless  felt  all  the  alarms  common,  to  troops 
engaging  in  battle  for  the  first  time,  but  they 
did  not  yield  to  their  fears.  And  to  this  point 
it  seems  to  me  any  raw  troops  may  bring  them- 
selves by  the  force  of  reason  alone,  especially 
when  r.ssistcd  a  little,  by  experienced  ofiicers. 
Let  each  man  g'o  into  the  battle-field  with  this 
train  of  reflections  :  "  I  shall  be  frightened 
of  course.  At  what  ?  Why  at  the  danger  to 
which  my  life  is  exposed.  Well  now  what  is 
really  the  extent  of  the  danger  '/  In  the  most 
sanguinary  "battles,  not  one-fifth  of  the  com- 
batants are  killed  or  wounded.*  The  chances 
are,  therefore,  five  to  one  that  1  shall  not  be 
hurt.  The  proportion  of  slightly  and  recov- 
erably  wounded  is  to  the  killed  and  mortally 
wounded  as  five  to  one.  The  chances  are, 
therefore,  five  to  one,  that  if  toudicd  at  all  I 
shall   not  be   mortally  wounded.     The  cannon 


are  the  common  engines  wliicli  unnerve  men. 
Now  of  the  whole  number  of  killed  in  battle,  not 
more  than  one  in  one  hundred  are  killed  by 
cannon.*  A  hundred  to  one,  therefore,  that 
those  noisy  bellowcis  do  not  hurt  me.  The 
alternative  is  presented  to  me,  to  stand  my 
ground  in  spite  of  my  fears,  or  to  run.  Now, 
in  which  is  the  most  d&nger  ?  Why  surely  in 
runnings  for,  as  a  general  rule,  of  a  ^iven 
number,  more  men  are  killed  in  flight  than  in 
fight.  While  I  stand  my  ground,  1  am  all  the* 
time  destroying,  weakening  and  disheartening 
the  enemy,  and  encouraging  my  companions  in 
arms.  Victory,  therefore,  is  likely  to  ensure 
my  safety.  But  in  running,  I  may  be  killed  by 
the  vcr}^  men  whom  I  would  have  disabled  had 
1  stood  firm.  I  v»'eaken  our  forces,  throw  the 
battle  upon  a  reduced  number,  expose  them  to 
increased  labors  and  losses,  become  then  an 
object  0^. their  hatred  and  contempt,  dispirit 
them,  and  invigorate  the  foe,  not  only  for  this 
battle,  but  for  all  future  battles.  The  regu- 
lars show  that  battles  lose  their  terrors  trhen 
we  become  used  to  them ;  how  am  I  ever  to 
become  used  to  them  by  running  ?  If  .1  save 
my  life  by  it,  I  increase  the  danger  of  being 
made  prisoner  a  hundred  fold.  Fear  or  n« 
fear,  then,  I  will  fight  as  long  as  the  regulars 
fight.'' 


*I  state  this  upon  the  authority  of  a  Brigadier-General  of 
many  battles,  who  has  turned  his  attention  to  this  jiiatter  on 
the  field. 


Now  in  all  this  I  put  love  of  co\mti7 ;  Yan- 
kee insolence  and  brutsility,  entirely  out  of  the 
question;  for  with  panic-stricken  troops,  car- 
rying in  their  bosoms  no  antidote  for  their 
fears,  or  moral  remedy  for  their  natural  eifects, 
'these  considerations  are  utterly  worthless,  as 
has  been  most  lamentably  proven  in  our  last 
-great  battle.  The  remedy  is  found  in  the  fore- 
going; train  of  reflections.  They  cannot  make 
brave  men  of  cowards — they  cannot  prevent 
fears  on  the  battle-field,  but  they  surely  ou<^ht 
to  make  the  coward  and  the  timid  fight  man- 
fully in  spite  of  their  infirmities.  Officers 
should  impress  them  on  the  minds  of  their 
new  recruits  ;  and  as  such  men  fight  well  un- 
der a  General  in  whom  they  have  confidence, 
they  should  always,  if  practicable,  be  attached 
to  the  brigade,  division  or  corps  in  whose 
Generals  they  have  the  most  confidence.  Lord 
Wellington  is  reported  to  have  said*,  that  by 
nature  he  was  a  great  coward,  but  that  his 
pride  of  character,  self-respect  and  love  of 
country  predominated  over  his  fears.  The 
consequence  was,  that  he  became  the  hero  of 
heroes.  I  see  no  reason  why  every  soldier  in 
the  Confederate  army  might  not  become  a  hero 
upon  the  same  principle.  I  am  aware  of  the 
military  dogma,  that  men,  to  become  good 
soldiers,  must  first  become  mere  machines.  If 
this  be  true,  then  it  were  better  for  us  (policy 
aside)  to  make  up  our  armies  of  stout  able 
bodied  negroes,  enured  to   toil,  than  of  their 


high-minded,  chivalrous^  but  more  feeble  mas- 
ters. At  the  opening  of  the  war  our  armies 
were  com]:  osed  mainly  of  troops  of  the  latter 
class — men  of  science,  men  of  wealth,  men  of 
the  learned  professions,  congressmen,  legisla- 
tors, professors  and  students — all  accustomed 
to  a  life  of  comparative  ease.  There  was  little 
drilling  of  them,  or  time  for  drilling  them,  be- 
fore they  were  engaged  in  a  series  of  battles. 
The  conscript  laws  filled  our  ranks  with  men 
from  all  grades  of  society,  and  of  all  descrip- 
tions of  character — in  the  main,  hard-working, 
slrong-muscled,  able  bodied  men,  accustomed 
to  hard  living  and  constant  fitiguo.  They  have 
been  long  in  the  "machine"  factory,  long 
enough  to  have  every  attribute  of  humanity 
drilled  out  of  them.  Has  this  class  proved 
themselves  to  be  better  soldiers  than  the  other? 
Have  they  fought  better  ?  Have  they  gained 
more  victories?  Have  they  endured  more 
hardshijts,  and  with  more  patience?  Are 
there  fewer  deserters  among  them?  Let  the 
advocate  of  machine?'^  answer  these  questions. 
The  dogma  which  1  have  been  considering 
is  not  only  false,  but  is  in  the  highest  degree 
mischievous.  If  scientific  war  be  but  a  con- 
flict of  machines,  it  necessarily  follows  that 
the  power  which  has  the  greatest  number  of 
machines  must  in  the  end  be  victorious.  How 
is  it  possible  for  nine  millions  of  population 
(six  we  may  say)  to  bring  into  the  field  as 
many  men  as  can  twenty-three  millions  ?  And 


yet  we  seem  to  be  trying  tbe  hopeless  experi- 
ment. Everybody  is  to  be  called  to  arms.  In 
reason's  name.  I  ask  why.  We  have  a  plenty 
of  men  enrolled  to  whip  all  the  Yankees  in  the 
field  at  this  time,  if  our  men  \vill  but  fi^^ht  as 
they  did  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  !  Did 
we  lose  the  battle  of  Missionary  Ridge  from 
want  of  men  ?  No,  but  from  derangement  of 
our  machmery.  And  why  should  that  defeat 
run  us  all  crazy  ?  I  see  nothing  alarming  in 
it.  One  of  the  bitter  fruits  of  the  dogaia  in^ 
question,  is  that  officers  who  subscribe  to  it 
will  take  no  pains  to  inspire  their  men  with 
courage,  self-confidence  and  high-toned  patriot- 
ism, but  will  treat  them  pretty  much  as  they 
would  so  many  prize-fighters.  Away  with  the 
false  demoralizing  dogma  !  Soldiers,,  you  are 
moral  agents ;  do  for  yourselyes^  then,  what  I 
would  do  for  you  if  I  could.  Nerve  your- 
selves up  by  your  own  mental  energies  to 
deeds  of  noble  daring  and  unflinching  valor, 
though  your  enemy  be  three  to  jour  one. 


Chapter  II. 
My  first  chapter  was  addressed  to  raw  re- 
cruits. It  was  not  designed  to  dissipate  their 
fears  in  battle,  for  no  counsel  can  do  this ;  but 
to  teach  them  to  be  good  soldiers  in  spite  of 
their  fears.  To  show  them  that  if  they  will 
consult  their  own  personal  safet7,  they  will 
fight  in  fear  rather  than  run  from  fear.    I  now 


address  tlie  soldiers  generally.  Much  that  I 
have  said  to  the  first  class  is  equally  applicable 
to  this. 

Men  who  engage  in  battle  expecting  to  .be 
whipt,  are  yery  certain  to  be  wliipt.  The  rea- 
son is  plain  :  They  fight  without  object,  and 
without  spirit — their  thoughts  more  occupied 
in  finding  apologies  for  running  than  the 
achievement  of  victory.  Now  I  can  conceive 
of  but  these  four  things  which  can  induce  a 
rational  being  to  expect  defeat  in  battle  : 

1st.  Superiority  in  numbers  opposed  to  him. 

2d.  Superiority  in  arms. 

3d.  Superiority  in  valor. 

4th.  Superiority  in  generahship. 

Let  us  consider  these  matters  in  their  order: 

1st.    Suj^eriority  in  miniben. 

This  is  the  bugbear  that  made  cowards  of 
us  for  thirty  years  before  we  seceded,  which 
seems  to  have  turned  the  heads  of  half  the 
nation,  civil  and  military,  within  the  last  two> 
months,  and  which  seems  likely  to  make  us 
destroy  ourselves, to  keep  the  Yankees  from 
destroying  us. 

I  have  already  bestowed  a  few  remarks  upon 
this  head  ;  let  us  consider  it  a  little  more  in 
detail.  To  give  the  instances  in  which  brave 
men  conquered  twice  and  thrice  their  numbers 
would  be  to  write  a  book.  Take  a  few  cases 
from  our  own  history.  At  Big  Bethel,  thir- 
teen hundred  Confederates  put  to  confusion 
and  flight  four  thousand    Federals.     At  iht 


feattio  of  Blackburu's  Ford  (Bull  Hun)  one 
brijjade  whipt  twice  its  number.  At  the  first 
battle  of  Manassas,  thirty-eight  thousand  com- 
pletely routed  seventy-five  thousand.  It  is 
said  the  Yankees  fight  better  now,  than  they 
did  then;  and  that  the  Western  Federals  fight 
better  than  the  Eastern,  This  may  be  true, 
but  it  would  be  a  harmless  truth  if  we  did  not 
6ght  worse.  We  whipt  Western  troops  at 
Chickamauga,  and  we  would  have  whipt  them 
again  at  Missionary  llidge  if  a  brigade  or  more 
of  our  men  had  not  played  the  coward.  • 

Even  in  the  rout  which  these  men  led  off", 
Cleburne's  gallant  band  arrested  the  wl.ole 
Federal  army,  when  there  were  probably  four 
to  one  against  him.  This  I  regard  as  by  far 
the  most  brilliant  feat  of  the  war.  To  have 
s.tood  his  ground  would  have  been  creditable 
to  him  and  his  men,  but  in  the  midst  of  con- 
fusion and  flight  to  have  formed  his  men  in  an 
advantageous  position,  and  to  have  maintained 
it  against  repeated  assaults  of  overwhelming 
numbers,  and  to  have  defeated  them,  entitles 
him  to  a  monument  as  high  as  Lookout,  and  to 
each  of  his  men  one  as  high  as  Missionary 
liidge.  I  hope  ho  will  preserve  with  peculiar 
earc  the  name  of  every  man  that  stood  by  him 
in  that  memorable  conflict."^' 


*If  the  papers  speak  truth,  according  to  Bragg,  Bates  and 
his  small  brigade  are  entitled  to  all  the  credit  that  I  have  given 
to  Cleburne  and  his  men.  If  so,  let  the  names  be  changed  and 
the  honors  stand. 


Here,  then,  we  have  aa  illustration  ifoin  the 
same  battle-field,  of  the  difference  between 
ranoinj^  from  feuperior  numbers  and  fi<;hting 
them  bravely.  Cleburne  demonstrated,  under 
every  discouragement,  that  Western  troops, 
even  in  the  exultation  of  victory,  may  be 
whipt  by  inferior  numbers,  when  possessed  of 
superior  valor.  Letrthe  renefi,ades  remember 
this,  and  retrieve  their  cred.t  by  fighting  gal- 
lantly in  their  next  battle  ! 

There  are  other  considerations  which  it  seems 
to  me  should  divest  numbers  of  their  terrors 
ta.reflecting  troops ;  at  least  so  far  as  to  raise 
them  above  cowardly  conduct. 

These  truths  all  will  admit  :  The  more  men 
in  the  army,  the  more  unwieldy  and  sluggish 
does  it  become,  the  more  difficult  is  it  to  make 
them  effective  in  action,  the  more  on  the  sick 
list,  the  more  killed  by  a  given  number  of 
■;hots,  the  more  trans}X)rtation  and  provisions 
do  they  require,^  and  the  more  unlikely  that 
they  will  have  a  commander  capable  of  direct- 
ing their  movements  skillfully  and  usefully. 
Those  are  most  serious  drawbacks  to  a  large 
army,  especially  when  far  away  from  home. 
They  will  of  theniselves  exhaust  it  in  time.  A 
small  army,  then,  has  every  advantage  of  a 
large  one,  except  in  the  single  matter  of  num- 
bers. They  are  more  immediately  under  the 
eye  of  their  conmauder,  mare  readily  concen- 
trated, more  prompt  in  reaching  the  points  of 
attack^  lose  fewer  in  battle,  and  in  retreat,  (or- 


10 

derly  fttreat  I  mean,)  are  absolutely  unap- 
proachable by  their  cumbersome  foe.  These 
facts  are  of  themselves  sufficient  to  account  for 
the  many  victories  which  inferior  numbers 
have  gained  over  superior.  Let  us  suppose 
that  Grant  commands  a  hundred  thousand 
men  and  Johnston  but  fifty  thousand.  There 
are  twenty  positions  between  Dalton  and  Atlan- 
ta, which  Johnston  may  occupy  with  the  cer- 
tainty of  whipping  Grant,  if  his  men  will  fight 
bravely.  (It  is  to 'be  hoped  he  has  examined 
all  these  positions.)  Should  he  be  driven  from 
one  of  these  positions  after  hard  fighting,  his 
losses,  compared  with  those  of  the  enemy,  will 
be  about  as  bne  to  five.  And  so  of  all  the 
other  positions.  But  there  is  one  view  of  the 
subject  which  should  quiet  all  fears  of  the 
soldier  on  the  score  of  numbers,  and  it  is  this: 
That  it  is  absolutely  impossible  for  Grant  to 
conquer  Johnston  in  the  case  supposed,  be- 
cause it  is  absolutely  impossible  for  him  to 
Jorce  Johnston  into  a  fight  upon  ground  of  his 
own  choosing.  Upon  the  whole,  then,  there  is 
no  great  cause  of  alarm  to  the  soldier  in  the 
numbers  opposed  to  him.  The  Fabian  policy 
avoids  defeat  at  least 

ii^d.  Superioritt/  in  o.riiu.  Except  in  artil- 
lery, I  know  of  no  advantage  the  enemy  have 
of  us  in  arms — certainly  none  to  be  feared. 
Of  artillery  I  hav^j  already  spoken,  and  shown 
that  they  are  the  least  formidable  implements 
of  war  of  any  that  are  used.    For  the  dcstruc- 


^  11 

tion  of  fortificotionsj  ships  acd  towns,  cannon 
are  useful;  but  for  field  service  they  are  the 
most  inconvenient,  cumbersome,  inefficient,  ex- 
•  pensive,  worthless  engines  of  war  that  ever 
were  invented.  A  man  told  me  he  had  been 
in  six  battles,  and  he  had  never  seen  a  man 
killed  by  a  cannon  or  bomb  in  his  life.  Anoth- 
er told  me  that  he  had  belonged  to  an  artillery 
corps  for  two  years  ;  that  ya  that  time  they  had 
broken  down  four  teams  of  horses,  and  been 
brought  into  action  but  once,  in  whioli  he  had 
no  reason  to  believe  that  th^  had  killed  a  sin- 
gle man.  They  fear  cannon,  then,  simply  be- 
cause men  cease  to  reason  when  they  engage  in 
battle,  and.  surrender  themselves  to  their  in- 
stinctive impulses. 

3d.  Su]}cnork7/  in  valor.  This  the  Yankees 
have  never  shown,  and  never  will  show,  until 
our  troops  become  the  biggest  of  fools  and  the 
meanest  of  cowards. 

4th.  Superioriti/  of  Genet  ahhip.  Certainly 
there  is  no  cause  for  fear  from  this  source  as 

yet. 

Reason  cTown  your  fears,  then,  soldiers  :  but 
if  you  cannot;  fight  them  down. 


Chapter  III. 
In  all  that   I  have  said  to  you,  or  mean  to 
say  to  you,  I  suppose  you  to  fight  against  supe- 
rior  numbers.     I  have   endeavored  to  demon- 
strate to  you,  that  there  is  not  near  the  danger 


12 

ID  meeting  superior  numbers  iu  the  field  that 
is  generally  supposed.  In  a  conflict  of \)ne 
thousand  against  two  thousand,  the  first  of 
unyielding  valor,  and  the  second  of  couiniju. 
soldiery;  which  is  likely  to  conquer?  Every 
man  in  the  world  will  answer,  ''  the  first."  Is 
this  not  an  unquestionable  truth  ?  Why,  then, 
will  Eot  reasonable  beings  reduce  it  to  practice 
in  war?  '^Because,"  it  will  be  answered, 
''  men  cannot  screw  {hemselvcs  up  to  unyield- 
ing valor."  True,  but  with  a  man  of  common 
sense,,  it  should  require  but.very  little  screwing 
to  do  that  which^ill  ensure  him  victory,  valor 
or  no  valor.  When  I  was  a  boy  about  thirteen 
years  of  age,  my  father  lived  fourteen  miles 
from  Augusta.  On  the  road  to  the  city,  there 
was  one  point  where  a  man  had  been  mur- 
dered, and  another  where  a  woman  had  been 
killed,  and  stories  were  rife  in  the  neighbor- 
hood of  terrific  sights  seen  at  these  places  at 
night.  I  do  not  S'.:ppose  that  a  house  full  of 
gold  could  have  induced  me  to  pass  them 
alone  ot  night.  One  day  my  father  remarked, 
in  my  presence,  "  I  never  allowed  my  children 
to  be  frightened  with  foolish  stories  about 
ghosts,  &c  There  is  my  *=5=^-*^  who,  if  neces- 
sary, would  go  from  here  to  Augusta  at  mid- 
night, with  no  Tnore  fear  than  I  would  feel  at 
doing  so."  "  Mercy  on  me,"  thought  I,  "how 
little'  my  father  knows  of  his  *-'^-**  !"  But 
the  remark  had  a  magical  eft'ect  upon  me.  It 
set  me  to  thinking  of  the  folly  of  my  fears, 


the  glory  I  should  have  in  verifying  my 
father's  opinion  of  me,  and  the  shame  that  I 
should  feel  at  his  discovering  that  he  had 
over-estimated  me,  and  I  hegan  to  entertiiin  a 
timid  desire  to  prove  mj  heroism.  Not  long 
after  this.,  1  was  belated,  and  had  to  pass  one  of 
these  places  at  night  and  alone.  I  was  awfully 
alarmed  as  I  approached  the  spot,  but  I  de- 
termined to  go  slowly  by  it.  When  J  reached 
it  my  fears  rapidly  subsided  ;  "  and  now," 
thought  I,  ''if  I  can  only  tell,  when  I  get 
home,  that  I  stopped  and  searched  for  ghosts 
and  blue-liglits,  and  listened  for  groanings, 
&c.,  what  an  honor  it  will  be  to  me  !"  I  did 
so,  and  thenceforward  became  a  tolerably 
brave  boy. 

Now,  if  such  inducements  as  these  could 
make  a  timid  boy  act,  the  hero,  why  should 
not  love  of  countrj',  the  glory  of  victory  and 
the  shame  of  defeat,  make  even  cowards  act 
the  hero  ?  But  I  am  departing  from  the  sub- 
jects proposed  for  this  article.  I  come  now  to 
speak  of  actual  operations  in  the  field. 

If  ten  thousand  engage  twenty  thousand, 
the  labor  of  fighting  is  about  equal  on  both 
sides.  The  human  constitution  can  only  en- 
dure a  certain  amount  of  labor  and  fatigue, 
and  at  this  point  the  belligerent  must  stop. 
All  other  things  being  equal  then,  if  the  ten 
thousand  hold  on  to  this  point,  thei/  cannot 
possihlij  he  conquered ;  and  it  is  a  hundred  to 
one,  that  the  twenty  thousand  yield  the  con- 
test before  they  reach  the  point  of  exhaustion. 


14 

Cliaryc  of  baj/oncfs.  If  the  soldier  forgets 
all  else  that  I  have  written  or  may  write,  let 
him  nof  forget  what  I  saj  upon  this  head. 
It  has  been  «aid  that  in  all  iJonaparte's  battles 
there  were  but  three  instances  of  a  fight  with 
ba3^onets.  With  these  exceptions,  whenever 
he  or  his  adversaries  brought  the  battle  to  a 
hand-to-hand  fight,  one  or  the  other  party  in- 
variably gave  way.  Now  he  fought  every 
nation  in^  Europe,  and  (with  one  exception,) 
always  with  inferior  numbers.  The  Turks 
he  ibug];it  in  Egyjj)t  and  Syria — a  barbarous 
people.  At  Acre,  he  fought  the  Turks,  as- 
sisted by  the  English.  I  do  not  remember 
that  his  troops  ever  recftiled  from  a  charge  of 
bayonets.  Be  that  as  it  niuy,  we. all  know 
that  up  to  his  iiussian  campaign,  his  battles 
were  little  else  than  one  unbroken  series  of 
victories.  I  have  en<i[uirpd  of  a  number  of  our 
officers  and  soldiers,  xvhether  they  ever  wit- 
nessed a  fight  with  bayonets  during  this  war; 
and  I  have  not  found  the  man  who  has  seen 
snah  a  thing.  And  yet,  I  have  heard  of  a 
hundred,  if  not  five  hundred— charges  being 
made  during  the  war.  In  all  these  charges 
then,  one  or  the  other  party  must  have  given 
way.  Now  what  is  the  conclusion  fro?n  all 
this  ?  Why,  tha^t  whether  you  fight  with 
civilized  or  barbarous  nations,  or  with  civilized 
and  barbarous  mixed,  with  royalists  or  repub- 
licans, with  equal  or  unequal  numbers^  (the 
disproportion  not  being  very  great,)  you  have 


15 

only  to  stand  firm  in  a  bayonet  ifight,  to  assure 
you  of  victory.  There  is  nothing  in  war  more 
certain  than  this.  When  ^ the  battle  then 
comes  to  a  cross  of  bayonet^',  whatever  may  be 
your  ahu'uis,  see  it  through,  and  your  triumpli 
is  sure. 

Ch(uytn</  up  to  tlie  cannon  s  mouch.  This 
is  considered  the  very  acme  of  heroism.  Well 
now,  there  is  not  the  one-tenth  part  of  the 
danger  in  it  that  is  generally  suj>posed.  The. 
renson  is  plain.  Cannon  c;ihnoc  be  constantly 
adjusted  to  an  ever-approaching  object.  Many 
of  you  know  how  wildly  they  shoot,  until  the 
gunner,  by  a  number  of  experimental  shots, 
"  gets  the  ran^e,"  as  it  is.  called,  even  of  a. 
stationary  object.  But  that  range  is  lost  witli 
every  approach  of  the  object  to  the  cannon. 
2\one  but  the  most  exj^ert  riflemen  could  hit  a 
squirv^l  rapidly  ^^gr>Atijr;iTg  ^iv^^tf  ^^{  ''  ' 
movement  of  ati^i-rr.oii  \o  hit  rv^  approp.< 
regiment  must  be.  like  that  of  tlie  riflcui an  :, 
gun,  constantly  lowering,;  but  with  a  variable 
velocity,  as  the  regiment  approa(?lies  more  or 
less  rapidly.  If  the  regiment  oblique  a  little 
from  th'e  first  line  of  approach,  the  cannon 
must  undergo  two  adjustments  to  hit  it — the 
one  perpendicular,  and  the  other  lateral.  Now 
who  is  competent  to  make  the  lubberly  thing 
fulfil  all  these  conditions  ?  No  man  that  ever 
lived  or  ever  Will  live.  To  keep  a  cannon 
sighted  upon  a  moving  object  is  difficult 
enough  ;  but  to  load  it  and  fire  it,  and  still  keep 


16 

it  on  the  moving  object,  is  impossible.  'Olarch- 
ing  up  to  the  cannon's  mouth ^  then,  if  done 
<juickl_y,  is  demonstrably  less  dangerous  thaa 
re/nj^inin-r  stationaiy,  at  exact  cannon  range. 

A  word  more,  and  I  have  done.  Possibly, 
before  the  war  ends,  you  may  get  under  a 
General  who  may  <;omnuiiid  you  to  pursue  a 
routed  foe.  In  that  event,  stop  not  as  long  as 
you  can.  keep  your  feet.  Bear  hunger  and 
thirst,  to  the'utmo.st  point  of  endurance,  rather 
than  stop;  and  cutoff  your  arm  sooner  than 
pause  to  gather  booty  at  such  a  time.  The 
reason  is  obvious  j  when  yoiir  enemy  is  in 
flight,  hQ  is  impotent,  and  you  destroy  hrm 
without  hazard  to  yourselves.  His  dispersion 
is  su  great,  that  he  cannot  be  brought  to  face 
yon  again  for  months,  if  ever.  His  all  falls 
'nto  ;  our  hf^.n-is.  itiH  spirit  is  broken  for  all 
<.'ber  iis  w^  Wtv^  fi^'^ng, 
1    ,,  iialf  toM,  become  yours 

w);<3Li  you  floe. 

t'5ol(liersj-I;«Uy  to  heart  the  things  that  1  have 
written,,  and  reduce  them  to  practice,  and  our 
liberty  is  sure. 


Published  by  the 

Soldiers'  Tract  Association,  of  the  M.  E.  Church,  Soutli, 

Macon,  Go. 


pcRm^liFe* 

pH8.5 


